The professional biography of Agim Ceku, born in Pec in 1960, was created in three armies: the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA); the National Guard Militia (ZGN) which was later reorganized as the HV, and in the KLA which was transformed into the KPC. He completed military secondary school and two years of the JNA Academy in Belgrade, completing artillery studies at the military academy in Zadar. From 1984 to 1990 he was platoon commander in the JNA reserve officers' school, and from 1990 to 1991 he was platoon commander of the military academy artillery program in the JNA's Zadar school center.
In the ZGN he became commander of the 120 mm mortar unit in Zadar, and then the deputy commander of the battle division Novi Grad-Paljuv-Pridraga. In February 1992 he became the commander of the Maslenica battle division, and in July the commander of the anti-tank division of the 112th brigade. During Operation Maslenica he was the artillery commander of the 112th brigade, and then the artillery commander of the 9th guard brigade in Gospic.
He participated in Operation Medak Pocket, and he was wounded in battle in Lika and has the status of a disabled war veteran of the Homeland War. After this he became the chief of staff of the 9th guard brigade, and then the chief of the branch division in the national district of Gospic and the chief of staff of that national district. In this capacity he participated in the campaigns Lightning and Storm. During the last two years he was chief of staff of the 5th national district.
"I would like to offer Stipe Mesic the congratulations of all the members of the KPC and the citizens of Kosovo upon his election as president and to tell him that he enjoys great respect and authority among the Albanian people. I believe that he will remain a great friend to the Albanians wherever they live, and I am certain that I will receive confirmation that for Croatian politics Kosovo is no longer just an internal issue of Serbia but of the international community, that is, of the region of which Croatia is an influential and recognized member. I expect support for the plans, intentions and strategy of development of the KPC as the defense force of Kosovo and that Croatia will join the ranks of donating countries who will assist the equipping and training of the KPC. Finally, I would like president Mesic to visit Kosovo as soon as possible and to be the first statesman for whom I will organize a honorary reception by the Kosovo Guard in the liberated Pristina air base," said Ceku two days before his meeting with Mesic.
How do you assess the current situation in Kosovo?
Since the end of war fighting and operations the situation in Kosovo is improving and moving toward complete normalization. The situation is complicated by numerous and manifold problems but every day positive moves can be seen. The biggest problems are being created by the remaining and the subsequently injected elements of the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic which are attempting to keep Kosovo unstable and insecure through provocation, manipulations and organized incidents. Milosevic wants to accuse the Albanians, especially the KLA and now the KPC, for the insecurity and violence and to prove that the civil and military components of the international community are not competent to rule Kosovo, stabilize it and ensure the security of the citizens. His goal is to preserve influence on the developments in general and he is seeking reasons for a possible return to Kosovo.
Is there a possibility of this occurring?
There is no possibility of this occurring.
It seems that to some extent it is in your favor to have Milosevic remain in power as long as possible. Namely, the international community would probably have already forced you to negotiate with a democratically elected government in FRY...
One could say that the present situation is favorable for us. But we do not think about Slobodan Milosevic: we are finished with him and his fate can be decided by the Serbian people. We tried to talk to him about the fate of Kosovo in Rambouillet and Paris but he chose war and he lost. In any case, we are interested in having the democratically elected governments of our neighbors be of friendly disposition toward us.
Who among the Serbian opposition is most acceptable to you?
No one. The problem of the Serbs and the international community is that they cannot find a healthy opposition. Namely, what the whole opposition holds most against Milosevic is that he lost Kosovo, and consequently whichever of these parties comes to power, they will try to return Kosovo and again come into political conflict with us.
How is the Yugoslav Army behaving on the border with Kosovo?
What remains of its 52nd corps is concentrated against the border with Kosovo and is still "feeding" itself with convictions that it will return here. We have left the defense of the border and its supervision to KFOR and NATO, while we are preparing in the long term for independent defense.
Do you think that Milosevic might again embark on a war with NATO?
I don't think that this possibility exists, even though perhaps someone might want him to in order to complete the process which was started.
How many Albanians are there in Serbian prisons?
Approximately 3,500 people are imprisoned for no reason except for the fact that they are Albanian. According to our evidence, another 3,000 people are listed as missing and their fate is unknown.
What is your relation toward the Serbs who live in Kosovo?
We have called on all citizens of Serbian nationality who lived in Kosovo and did not take part in war crimes to stay here to live. Currently in Kosovo there are approximately 100,000 Serbs and if they have any sense of decency at all, they are remorseful because they supported a regime which committed crimes. They should apologize to their Albanian compatriots.
Kosovo is free, and responsibility for its security and development has been taken on by the international community. The independence of Kosovo is our primary goal but we will not apply pressure on the international community to recognize our independence. Our priority now, with the assistance of the international community, is the construction of Kosovo and the establishment of all democratic institutions. Perhaps the most important thing is to convince the international community that we are capable of governing Kosovo, that we can survive as an independent country and that we are mature and prepared to accept responsibility for stability and peace in the region. Under these circumstances independence is the normal and logical solution and I am certain that it will come relatively quickly.
Would you accept autonomy or the status of a republic within FRY?
We are not interested in independence in the sense of hard and fast borders protected by an army but in the sovereignty of the majority of the people, with the protection of the institutions of democratic government and openness toward all neighbors. We are familiar with the concept of the international community for the stabilization and democratization of southeastern Europe, and we have elected to seek solutions within that framework. We will be extremely careful not to come into conflict with that concept because we must prove that we are part of the world which it is trying to build. However, in no variant do we see Kosovo as a part of Serbia or FRY but as a region in a Europe of regions.
How many refugees have returned to Kosovo?
Of approximately 800,000 expelled Albanians, approximately 700,000 have returned. The international community was worried by the return of the refugees but their fears have been shown to be unfounded. Almost everyone has returned to their homes and thus shown that the people of Kosovo love Kosovo.
What is the relations of KPC with KFOR like?
We have very good relations. KFOR is the guarantor of security in Kosovo and in cooperation with them we are developing and strengthening the KPC as our own defense system for the long term and at the same time helping them to carry out their peace mission.
To what extent, and how, has KFOR obstructed the transformation of the KLA into a real Kosovo army?
After the arrival of the international forces in Kosovo we were faced with the explicit demand to immediately demobilize and dismiss the KLA. This request by the international community was based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the Rambouillet agreement and the military-technical agreement from Kumanovo. However, faced with our real and justified, demands and arguments, and with the real strength, influence, reputation and organization of the KLA, which was far better than they imagined before coming to Kosovo, the international organization nevertheless accepted the transformation of the KLA into Trupat e Mbrojtjes se Kosoves - TMK (Kosovo Protection Corps in English). By this we finally overcame the danger of our disappearance and ensured the survival of our own defense system.
The KLA is not disarmed but demilitarized; we have placed our arms under the joint supervision of the KPC and KFOR so they are not misused and used to endanger someone's security. In Kosovo it is no longer a time for arms but a time for work. We are not obsessed with the quantity and type of arms. In process is a long process of transformation in which the KLA, which at the end of the war numbered 20,000 soldiers, would be divided into several segments. The main body of the KLA was transformed into the KPC; other parts became political parties, a non-government organization for de-mining; a part demilitarized and a part will be joining the police. Of 4,000 policemen, the majority will be members of the KLA but not all.
How do you comment on the statements of some military analysts that you are only "faking" placing your arms under supervision and that you surrendered primarily antique pieces?
We completely implemented demilitarization in accordance with the signed agreement because we now no longer need arms. It is true that among the arms we turned in there were antique pieces because that is mainly what we fought with during the war. The KPC will have 2,000 rifles, of which 200 will be in used continuously to secure military establishments and armories, while the balance will be stored by the military establishment. It is normal that officers and policemen will have pistols with them.
How is the KPC organized?
The KPC is organized along the lines of the most contemporary defense organizations in the world. We have a staff command which consists of a main inspection branch, support services and eight departments: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, training and education, a civil-military relations administration, a command and communications systems administration and a resource management administration. The Kosovo Guard forms a separate unit (similar to the Croatian guard), and in addition to it we have six zones of for operational and territorial commands (similar to national districts): a defense academy, a command for training and doctrine, a main logistical base, an engineering brigade, a public relations unit, an ABKO unit, a sanitation unit and a helicopter fleet.
Are there any Serbs in the KPC and in the police force?
Of 350 Kosovo police graduates there are thirty-odd Serbs. Unfortunately, in the KPC we do not have a single Serb even though we would like it if we did because that is what we agreed to. According to documents on the organization of the KPC we accepted ten percent members of national minorities and we have approximately 130 Bosniaks, Turks and Roman but unfortunately no Serbs because they are refusing to accept the reality in Kosovo and they are manipulated by the Serbian regime.
In your opinion, how many Serbs who committed crimes against Albanian civilians will end up in the Hague?
Less than deserve to be there.
Is it possible for any member of the KLA to end up in the Hague?
No, it isn't. I believe in the objectivity of the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague. The KLA has not committed any crimes; it protected the people from criminals.
What political leaders do you support?
The political scene in Kosovo is not completely defined and as the commander of the KPC I equally respect all the parties and their leaders. I am privately in friendly contact with former colleagues from the KLA who have formed the political party PPDK. The KPC will support every party which wins the confidence of the people through elections.
Is the co-chair of the Interim Administration Council of Kosovo, who was also the temporary minister until January 31, Hashim Taqi, the long-term solution for Kosovo?
Taqi is today co-chair together with Rugova, Qosja and Kouchner and he has always had a clear vision of how the issue of Kosovo should be solved. He is my friend and our viewpoints have always been similar. The future of Kosovo remains in his hands and the hands of young people such as he.
What is your opinion of Ibrahim Rugova?
I think that he and his party did not live up to people's expectations in 1990 and that they did not recognize in which direction the wheel of history was turning. That is why he did not recognize, support and assist the KLA which was alone in recognizing the historic moment and took over responsibility for the fate of Kosovo.
What is the relation between Hashim Taqi and Ibrahim Rugova like?
As co-chairs, until the elections they share responsibility for the administration of Kosovo and by this very fact they must work well together.
There were more differences than similarities. The similarities were that we had the same enemy, who had the same intention, tactics and strategy (kill, burn, destroy, expel); both peoples won their respective wars, under war conditions we organized an army and defense system; through a just war we won the support of the international community, we gained many friends, precious experiences and the status of the victim.
However, in Croatia a position war was waged with a clearly defined battlefront while in Kosovo we waged a guerrilla and a maneuver war from many free, unconnected zones. Second, in Croatia the total social, economic, political and cultural potential was at the service and in support of the HV and the war, which was not the case in Kosovo. There was a great difference in the level of organization of the army as well as in the quality and quantity of arms and military equipment. Nevertheless, in Kosovo we had one great advantage in comparison with Croatia: the international community reacted relatively quickly.
How long did it take you to decide to retire from the HV and go to Kosovo?
I thought about it since the beginning of the 1990's because this was my life ambition. I expected the beginning of the war of liberation in Kosovo in 1991 and wished for a coalition for the liberation of all peoples in the region of the former Yugoslavia. Then, and until the end of 1998, I was disappointed that Kosovo politics did not want armed confrontation with the Serbs. Since the end of the war in Croatia in 1995 I met and contacted with the leaders of the KLA in Albania and in the Western countries. When open conflict broke out in March of 1998, I submitted my request for resignation from the HV to the commander of the 5th national district, general Miljenko Crnjac, and it was forwarded to president Tudjman himself. He retired me in February 1999. All my friends and superiors knew of my intentions but when the day came to leave I only told my wife and my friend Elvis. Even the children did not know that I was going to Kosovo. I traveled illegally for two days and one night, and as soon as I arrived, on March 20, 1999, I began helping in the staff command with plans, organization and reorganization. The situation developed more quickly and better than I expected, even though the right conditions for that did exist.
Who offered you the position of chief of staff of the KLA?
The political leadership - Hashim Taqi, with the concurrence of the commander of operations, decreed that I was to take over responsibility for the staff command of the KLA. Taqi thus took over the political, and I took over the military, part of the KLA.
Is it your idea to organize the Kosovo Guard along the same lines as the Croatian Guard?
There are two reasons why in organizing first the KLA and later the KPC I used the experience acquired during the Homeland War and in the structure of the HV: first, these are the best solutions I know of and second, they are Croatian. I am familiar with solutions from the JNA as well, from the eastern army, and I also had much theoretical knowledge about war, but the experience from the Homeland War refuted much of what I learned and read. Second, practical solutions in terms of organization of the HV, which are compatible with NATO standards, are actually much better than in many armies of the world. That is why I sought to build by experiences in the HV at every opportunity into the KLA and the KPC.
How do you comment on the statement of the KFOR spokesperson who said that the KLA should be transformed into a national guard based on the model of the American national guard?
The Kosovo Guard is similar to the Croatian Guard, they have practically the same organization, role and function. We are trying to make the Kosovo Guard, which now has approximately 600 members, into the elite part of the KPC. The tasks which the other parts of the KPC cannot carry out must be carried out by the Kosovo Guard because it is an example to others. In negotiations on the transformation of the KLA we chose to accept the model of the American national guard because we do not want a big army but a strong guard which will have only a defense role and will not constitute a threat to anyone. The concept of the international community for all the countries in this region is for them to have armies organized along the model of the American national guard. NATO will be responsible for the security of the whole region, and all the countries must build their security systems within the framework of systems for collective security in the region.
What was your relationship with minister Gojko Susak?
I was fortunate to have known minister Susak, and after every one of our meetings I had an even better opinion of him. I think that it was great fortune for the Croatian army and people to have such a minister. Thanks to him HV is a regional power today.
Can Susak's role in the HV be compared with your own in the KPC?
Susak is a great man and I cannot be compared with him because he was one of my idols. From him I learned how to defend, articulate and represent the national interest. When I had to make important decisions, I would use his opinion. I still do so today.